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13

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah from
which this appeal arises, is based on U.C.A. 78-3-4(l)(1953, as amended).
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court pursuant
to Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, U.C.A. 78-22(3)(j)(1995 Supp.) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This case
was poured over to the Court of Appeals by the Supreme Court on March 31,2000.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Was it reversible error for the District Court to deny the Robertson Family's

Motion for an Extension of Time to File a Notice of an Appeal when the evidence
demonstrated that the clerk of the court had misinformed counsel for the Robertson
Family, resulting in the filing of a Notice of Appeal one day after the time to file such a
notice had expired, and clearly constituting detrimental reliance and excusable neglect?
Standard of Review: Because the District Court's ruling was a legal, rather than a
factual, conclusion, this Court reviews the District Court's decision for correctness. West
v. Grand County. 942 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1997).
2.

Was it reversible error for the District Court to deny the Robertson Family's

Motion to Reconsider the District Court's denial of the Robertson Family's Motion to for

1
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an Extension of Time to File Notice of Appeal, pursuant to Rules 59 and 60, when the
evidence demonstrated that the Robertson Family's one day delay in filing its Notice of
Appeal was clearly the result of detrimental reliance and excusable neglect on the part of
its counsel, and there was an insufficiency of evidence to justify the Court's denial of the
Robertson Family's Motion for an Extension of Time and/or said denial was an error in
law? Further, was it error for the District Court to deny the Robertson Family's Motion to
Reconsider, under the lenient standards of Rule 60, when the conduct of counsel for
Robertson Family clearly constituted excusable neglect, such that the Court's denial of
the Motion to Reconsider was an abuse of discretion.
Standard of Review: The District Court's ruling in denying Defendant's Motion
to Reconsider pursuant to Rules 59 and/or 60 will be reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard by this Court. Hart v. Salt Lake County Commission, 945 P.2d 125,
135 (Utah App. 1997); Classic Cabinets, Inc. v. All American Life Ins. Co.. 978 P.2d 465,
467 (Utah App. 1999).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action arises out of an arbitration claim filed by the Robertson Family with
the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) seeking damages on the grounds
that plaintiffs Paine Webber, Inc., Kidder, Peabody & Co., Incorporated and Van F. Dunn
(the "Plaintiffs") recommended and sold to the Robertson Family inappropriate
investments. In a desperate attempt to avoid arbitrating the Robertson Family's claim as

2
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required by the NASD, the Plaintiffs filed an action in the Third District Court, the
Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs presiding, seeking a temporary and permanent stay of the
NASD arbitration, on the grounds that the Robertson Family's claim was not filed with
the NASD within six years of its investment as required by §10304 of the NASD Code of
Arbitration Procedure.
The Robertson Family opposed the Plaintiffs' request for a temporary stay, and
filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Complaint on the grounds that the NASD, and not
the Utah District Court, should determine the meaning and application of §10304 of the
NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure. Apparently finding that the NASD was not the
appropriate body to determine the meaning of its own rules of arbitration procedure, the
District Court granted the Plaintiffs' request for a temporary stay, and denied the
Robertson Family's motion to dismiss.
Before the Robertson Family had an opportunity to perform discovery, the
Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on one ground: that the Robertson
Family's claim is barred because §10304 of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure
provides that claims based upon events occurring more than six years prior to the filing of
the claim are not eligible for arbitration. The Plaintiffs argued that all events giving rise to
the Robertson Family's Claim occurred in 1981, "over sixteen years prior to thefilingof
the claim," and thus that §10304 bars the Claim.
In response to the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the Robertson Family
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disputed the assertion of the Plaintiffs, and argued that all events giving rise to the
Robertson Family's Claim did not occur until October 1992; thus, the Robertson Family's
Claim was filed within the six year period of §10304. Moreover, even if the six year
period of §10304 began to run earlier than October 1992, argued the Robertson Family,
§10304 is a statute of limitations that is tolled by Utah's "discovery rule." Thus, because
Mr. Robertson did not become aware that the Robertson Family would lose all of its
investment until October 1992, the six year time period of §10304 was tolled until that
date. In addition, the Robertson Family requested that the Court deny or continue the
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and allow the Robertson Family to perform
discovery as allowed by U.R.C.P. 56(f), and filed an Affidavit of James L. Robertson in
support of such request.
The District Court granted the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and,
unknown to the Robertson Family and its attorney, the Court entered its Final Order
February 8, 1999.
On or about March 9th, 1999, twenty-nine days after entry of the final order, Brian
W. Steffensen, legal counsel for the Robertson Family, called Judge Fuch's clerk at the
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County and inquired if the District Court had
entered its Final Order. The Robertson Family's attorney made this inquiry because he
had not received notice from the District Court as to whether the Final Order had been
entered, even though the plaintiffs/appellees had filed their proposed form of order with
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the Court. At that time, the clerk incorrectly informed the Robertson Family's attorney
that the Court had issued its Final Order on February 10, 1999. Because the District Court
did not send to the Robertson Family's attorney a copy of the Final Order, he had not
previously been aware that the Court had issued the Final Order.
Therefore, based on the representation of the District Court's Clerk, counsel for
the Robertson Family calculated that the Robertson Family had thirty days from February
10, 1999, in which to file a Notice of Appeal to appeal the District Court's rulings and
orders in this action. In other words, it was counsel's understanding that the Robertson
Family had until March 12, 1999 in which to file its Notice of Appeal. Therefore, Mr.
Steffensen executed a Notice of Appeal and gave it to his secretary for filing on
Wednesday, March 10, 1999, instructing her to file it with the District Court that day
together with the appropriate fee. However, counsel's secretary apparently did not cause
the Notice of Appeal to be filed with the District Court until the next day, March 11,
1999, because she did not believe that the deadline for filing would run until Friday,
March 12, 1999.
Counsel for the Robertson Family instructed his secretary to pay the appropriate
filing fee, and assumed that when his messenger filed the Notice of Appeal with the
District Court, that the appropriate filing fee was in fact paid, because the office of the
Clerk of the District Court accepted the Notice of Appeal and filed the same. However,
on March 18, 1999, Wendy Purnell, the front office clerk of the Judge Fuchs, telephoned
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the Robertson Family's attorney, and told him that she could not docket the Robertson
Family's Notice of Appeal because the requisite filing fee had not been filed. Therefore,
counsel immediately filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on March 18,1999, andfiledit
with the District Court along with the requisite filing fee.
The Utah Court of Appeals then transferred the case to the Utah Supreme Court
for decision, where the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Disposition on the Grounds
that the Robertson Family had not filed their Notice of Appeal within 30 days as required
by Utah R. App. Proc. 4(a). The Supreme Court granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Disposition by its Order dated June 1,1999. In its Order, the Supreme Court
stated that "Plaintiffs' motion for summary dismissal is granted. Defendant filed its
appeal one day late, and this court lacks jurisdiction over the case. Defendant's remedy
lies with the district court if it seeks an extension of time in which to renew its appeal."1
On June 23,1999, the Robertson Family filed a Motion for An Extension of Time
in Which to File notice of Appeal. The Robertson Family argued, and provided affidavits
of counsel, demonstrating that counsel had been misinformed by the clerk of the Court as
to the date the Order granting the Motion for Summary Judgment had been entered,
thereby causing a calendaring error by counsel for the Robertson Family. The Notice of
Appeal would have been timely filed had the information from the Clerk of the Court
been accurate. However, as the information was inaccurate, the Notice was filed one day

'Order of the Utah Supreme Court dated June 1,1999 (Index No. 195).
6
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late. The Robertson Family Trust argued this was clearly excusable neglect on the part of
its counsel and as such they should be permitted to file the Notice of Appeal. On
September 9, 1999, the Court denied the Robertson Family's Motion for an Extension of
Time on the grounds that it was not excusable neglect.
On September 13, 1999, the Robertson Family timely moved the Court to
reconsider, pursuant to U.R.C.P. Rules 59 and 60, its ruling denying the Motion for an
Extension of Time. On December 8, 1999, the Court denied the Robertson Family's
Motion to Reconsider and entered an order to that effect.
The present Appeal was then filed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On March 10, 1998, the Robertson Family filed its verified Claim with the

NASD. The claim is verified by James L. Robertson. The plaintiffs attached to their
memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment a true and correct copy of
the verified Claim and they stipulated that the facts contained in the verified Claim were
undisputed.2
2.

During 1981, Mr. Robertson sold some shares of stock that resulted in a profit

that was unusually large for him. His broker in selling the stock was an acquaintance of

2

Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, p. 5. (Index No. 78)
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his, Van F. Dunn, who was an account executive at Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc.3
3.

Because of his unusually large gain from the sale of stock, in the Spring of

1981, Mr. Robertson met with Mr. Dunn to discuss whether a tax shelter investment
would be suitable for him. During this meeting Mr. Robertson told Mr. Dunn that because
of the recent sale of stock, and because he would be selling more stock in the near future,
his income during 1981 would be unusually high. Mr. Robertson asked Mr. Dunn if he
knew of a good tax shelter investment that would not only shelter his income in 1981, but
that would turn a profit in a fairly short time period, or around five years. Mr. Robertson
also told Mr. Dunn that he needed the safest possible investment. Moreover, Mr.
Robertson told Mr. Dunn that he had not been in a 50% tax bracket before 1981, and that
he didn't expect to be in the 50% tax bracket in the future.4
4.

In response to Mr. Robertson's inquiry about the safest possible investment,

Mr. Dunn recommended an investment in Lauren Plaza Associates, Ltd. ("Lauren
Plaza"), an Illinois Limited partnership that was financing a shopping center in Louisiana.
Mr. Dunn indicated that because Lauren Plaza contemplated selling its investment in the
shopping center within approximately five years, that an investment in the partnership
would: 1) shelter income in the short term, and 2) result in a profit within a fairly short
3

Affidavit of James L. Robertson in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgement
("Robertson Affidavit"), 12, (Index No. 127).
4

Plaintiff s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, f2 (Index No. 83); Robertson Affidavit, f3, (Index No.
127).
8
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time.5
5.

Because Mr. Robertson did not feel comfortable simply relying on his own

judgment before making an investment in the Lauren Plaza, he had his accountant, E.
Dickson Adams, meet with Mr. Dunn to discuss the investment. Mr. Dunn convinced Mr.
Adams that the Lauren Plaza was not only suitable for Mr. Robertson, but also that Mr.
Robertson should purchase two units in the Lauren Plaza, rather than just one, for a total
price of $158,000.00.6
6.

Because of Mr. Dunn's recommendation, and in reliance upon Mr. Dunn's

recommendation, Mr. Robertson purchased two shares in the Lauren Plaza, for a total
price of $158,000.00.7
7.

Subsequent to his investment in the Lauren Plaza, Mr. Robertson transferred

his ownership of the Lauren Plaza shares to the Robertson Family Trust, and he is the
trustee for the trust.8
5

Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, ^|3 (Index No. 84); Robertson Affidavit, <[}4, (Index No.
127).
6

Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, f4 (Index No. 84); Robertson Affidavit, f 5, (Index No.
127-28); Affidavit of E. Dickson Adams,fflfl-7,(Index No. 123-24).
7

Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, f 5, (Index No. 84); Robertson Affidavit, f6, (Index No.
123-24).
8

Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, ^[6, (Index No. 84-85); Robertson Affidavit, ^|7, (Index
9
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8.

In 1984, Mr. Robertson contacted the general partner in the Lauren Plaza,

Balcor Management Services, Inc., and asked about the appreciated value of the
partnership based on the 98% occupancy level supposedly being maintained in the
shopping center. Balcor did not opine as to the value of the partnership or its shares
because there was no plan to sell the shopping center; therefore, no appraisal was
available.9
9.

In 1986, Mr. Robertson was informed by Balcor Management Services, Inc.,

that although the occupancy level in the shopping center was 97% problems had
developed, and there were no plans to sell the property at that time.10
10. Nonetheless, in every annual report after 1986, Balcor continued to express
optimism. In fact, in 1989, Balcor reported rents were being collected on 95% of the
property. In the November 1990 report, Balcor states, "...net cash flow is ahead of our
projection for the year."11

No. 124).
9

Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, f7, (Index No. 85); Robertson Affidavit, f8, (Index No.
128).
10

Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, ^8 (Index No. 85); Robertson Affidavit, f9, (Index No.
128).
11

Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, ^9 (Index No. 85); Robertson Affidavit, TflO (Index No.
128).
10
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11.

In the 1991 annual report, Balcor states, "Our original intention was to hold

the property for five to ten years from acquisition in 1981, or until such time as a sale or
refinancing would meet the partnership's objectives. We are now in the twelfth year of
the holding period, and we anticipate holding the property an additional two to three
years, assuming a loan modification is negotiated."12
12.

Mr. Robertson reviewed these annual reports and relied upon them as

indicating that his investment was still safe.'3
13. However, in a letter to the shareholders dated October 1992, Balcor wrote,
"A foreclosure sale has been scheduled for October 21, 1992, at which point we expect
the partnership to relinquish title to this property." Because of the foreclosure on the
Lauren Plaza, the Robertson Family lost $154,050.00 ($158,000.00 invested less $3,950
cash distributions).14 Mr. Robertson did not know that his investment in Lauren Plaza
would be valueless until he was notified of the foreclosure sale by Balcor's October 1992
letter.15
12

Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, TflO (Index No. 85); Robertson Affidavit, ^Jl 1 (Index No.
128-29).
"Robertson Affidavit, ^9 (Index No. 128).
'"Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, Exhibit A,ffl|12,14(Index No. 85-86); Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment, Exhibit 3 (Index No. 93-95); Robertson Affidavit, ^[12 (Index No.
129).
15

Robertson Affidavit, f 12 (Index No. 129).
11
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14. Mr. Robertson relied on Mr. Dunn's representations that the Lauren Plaza
was a suitable investment for him, and Mr. Robertson would not have invested in Lauren
Plaza but for Mr. Dunn's recommendations. In fact, the Lauren Plaza was not a suitable
investment for Mr. Robertson because, among other things, 1) he was not in the 50% tax
bracket before or after the calendar year 1981, and 2) the partnership shares were not
easily transferable, there being no market for the shares.16
15. Subsequent to Mr. Robertson's acquisition of shares in Lauren Plaza, Kidder,
Peabody & Co., Incorporated, was acquired by plaintiff Paine Webber, which is the
successor in interest to Kidder, Peabody.
16.

On March 10, 1998, the Robertson Family Trust ("Robertson Family")

submitted a Statement of Claim to the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
("NASD"), seeking to arbitrate a claim the Robertson Family has against Paine Webber,
Inc., KidderPeabody & Co., Inc., and one of KidderPeabody's brokers, Van Francis
Dunn, Jr.17 As noted above, in response to the Robertson Family's Arbitration Claim, the
Brokers filed an action in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
seeking an order temporarily and permanently staying the NASD arbitration on the
grounds that the Robertson Family's claim was not arbitrable because it was barred by
16

Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, f 13 (Index No. 86); Robertson Affidavit, f 13 (Index No.
129).
17

Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, Exhibit A (Index No. 83-86)
12
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§10304 of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, and that the District Court, and not
the NASD, should determine whether the Robertson Family's claim is arbitrable.18
Section 10304 of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure provides:
No dispute, claim, or controversy shall be
eligible for submission to arbitration under the
Code where six (6) years have elapsed from the
occurrence or event giving rise to the act or
dispute, claim, or controversy. This Rule shall
not extend applicable statutes of limitations, nor
shall it apply to any case which is directed to
arbitration by a court of competent jurisdiction.
17.

The Robertson Family opposed the Brokers' request for a temporary stay,

and filed a motion to dismiss the Brokers" Complaint on the grounds that the NASD, and
not the District Court, should determine the meaning and application of §10304 of the
NASD Code of Arbitration.19 Apparently finding that the NASD was not the appropriate
body to determine the meaning of its own rules of arbitration procedure, the District Court
granted the Brokers' request for a temporary stay, and denied the Robertson Family's
motion to dismiss.20
18. The Brokers then filed a motion for summary judgment on one ground: that

18

Plaintiffs' Complaint (Index No. 1-22); Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Temporarily
Staying Arbitration Proceeding (Index No. 23-55).
19

Robertson Opposition to Motion to Stay (Index No. 62-70); Robertson Motion
Dismiss (Index No. 62-70)
20

Order Temporarily Staying Arbitration Proceeding (Index No. 109; 160-63);
Order Denying Motion to Dismiss (Index No. 167-69).
13
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the Robertson Family's claim is barred because §10304 of the NASD Code of Arbitration
Procedure provides that claims based upon events occurring more than six years prior to
the filing of the Claim are not eligible for arbitration.21 The District Court granted the
Brokers' motion for summary judgment, and entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order on February 8, 1999.22
19.

On or about March 9th, 1999, twenty-nine days after entry of the final order,

Brian W. Steffensen, legal counsel for the Robertson Family, called Judge Fuch's clerk at
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County and inquired if the District Court
had entered its Final Order.23 At that time, the clerk incorrectly informed the Robertson
Family's attorney that the Court had issued its Final Order on February 10. 1999.24 Based
on the representation of the District Court's Clerk, counsel for the Robertson Family
calculated that the Robertson Family had thirty days from February 10, 1999, in which to
file a Notice of Appeal to appeal the District Court's rulings and orders in this action,
therefore until March 12.25
20.

Mr. Steffensen executed a Notice of Appeal and gave it to his secretary for

21

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Index No. 71-98).

22

District Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (Index No. 177-

81)
"Affidavit of Brian W. Steffensen, f 2 (Index No. 209-11)
^Affidavit of Brian W. Steffensen, ^ 2 (Index No. 209-11)
25

Affidavit of Brian W. Steffensen, f 3 (Index No. 209-11)
14
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filing on Wednesday, March 10, 1999, instructing her to file it with the District Court that
day together with the appropriate fee. However, counsel's secretary apparently did not
cause the Notice of Appeal to be filed with the District Court until the next day, March
11, 1999, because she did not believe that the deadline for filing would run until Friday,
March 12, 1999.26
21.

The Utah Court of Appeals transferred the case to the Utah Supreme Court

for decision, where the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Disposition on the Grounds
that the Robertson Family had not filed their Notice of Appeal within 30 days as required
by Utah R. App. Proc. 4(a).27 The Supreme Court granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Disposition by its Order dated June 1, 1999.28 In its Order, the Supreme Court
stated that "Plaintiffs' motion for summary dismissal is granted. Defendant filed its
appeal one day late, and this court lacks jurisdiction over the case. Defendant's remedy
lies with the district court if it seeks an extension of time in which to renew its appeal."29
22.

On June 23, 1999, Plaintiffs filed a motion requesting an extension of time

to file a Notice of Appeal.30 The Court denied said motion on the grounds that filing of

26

Affidavit of Brian W. Steffensen, f3 (Index No. 210)

27

Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Disposition.

28

0rder of the Supreme Court (Index No. 222).

29

0rder of the Supreme Court (Index No. 222).

30

Robertson's Motion for Extension of Time to File Notice of Appeal (Index No.
197-213).
15
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the Notice of Appeal one day late, although ostensibly caused by the Court Clerk's
providing inaccurate information to counsel for plaintiff, was inexcusable neglect by the
Robertson's counsel.31
23.

Plaintiff subsequently filed a Rule 59 and 60 Motion for

"Reconsideration."32 This Motion was denied by the District Court on December 8,
1999.33
24.

The present appeal was subsequently filed on January 6, 2000.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In the underlying action, the District Court made the determination that it had
jurisdiction to rule on Plaintiffs Motion to Stay NASD Arbitration Proceedings, and
granted said Motion. Further, the District Court entertained Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment. The primary thrust of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment was
that, pursuant to the provisions of the NASD, the Robertson's claims were barred by the
statute of limitations. The Court agreed with Plaintiffs and granted their Motion for
Summary Judgment. In doing so the District Court usurped the authority of the NASD to
interpret their own code provisions. Rather than allow the NASD, which drafted its code
provisions and had expertise and experience in interpreting them, to determine if the
31

Order Denying Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal (Index No. 235-37).

32

Robertson's Motion to Reconsider (Index No. 238-244 ).

33

0rder Denying Motion to Reconsider (Index No. 264-66 ).
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claims were barred by the statute of limitations, the District Court interjected its own
interpretation of the provisions and held that the claims were barred.
The issue of whether a District Court may unilaterally bar a claimant from
pursuing legitimate claims under the provisions of the NASD, by determining that the
claims are barred by a statute of limitations contained within the NASD Code, is a matter
of first impression in the State of Utah. It is a significant issue in that, if the District
Court's decision is allowed to stand unchallenged, any NASD claimant may be subject to
being dragged into litigation in the District Court under the premise that the Court, not the
NASD, has the authority to interpret and mle on the NASD provisions. Such a holding is
in direct contravention to the very reason for the NASD, namely to prevent costly
litigation and provide claimants with a quick and inexpensive means of resolving
disputes. Additionally, the holding will necessarily create, rather than minimize litigation
which could and should be handled through the arbitration proceedings required by the
NASD.
Counsel for the Robertsons, Brian W. Steffensen, believed that the District Court,
in granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, had made a ruling that was legally
incorrect. As such, an appeal of the decision was necessary.
The District Court does not regularly notify counsel when its final orders are
entered. As such, it is incumbent upon counsel to check with the Court periodically to
determine if the final order has been entered, such that they are aware of when the 30 day
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time period in which to file a Notice of Appeal has begun. In the present case, Mr.
Steffensen contacted the clerk of the Court on what was in reality the 29th day after the
final order of the Court, granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, had been
entered. However, he was informed by the Clerk of the Court that it was only the 27th day
after entry of the final order. Mr. Steffensen had the Notice of Appeal filed within 48
hours of contacting the clerk of the Court. According to the information he had been
provided, and which he relied upon, his Notice of Appeal was filed one day before the
expiration of the 30 day period. However, as a result of the misinformation he was
provided, the Notice was actually filed one day late.
As the Notice of Appeal was filed one day late, Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the
Appeal as being untimely. Said Motion was granted and the Supreme Court instructed
counsel for the Robertsons that to perfect the appeal he would need to seek leave from the
District Court for an extension of time to file the Notice of Appeal. As such, Mr.
Steffensen filed a Motion seeking an extension of time to file the Notice of Appeal. Said
Motion was denied by the District Court on the sole grounds that the delay infilingthe
notice was not excusable neglect on the part of counsel for the Robertsons. Such a
holding is untenable as a matter of law given the facts present in this case. To uphold
such a ruling is to support the notion that no attorney can rely on information received
from District Court personnel.
In essence, this is simply a question of what constitutes excusable neglect. If the
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Court believes that it is not excusable neglect to rely on information provided by the clerk
of the Court, which is later determined to be incorrect, in calendaring a filing deadline,
then this appeal should be denied. However, if the Court believes an attorney is justified
in relying on information provided by Court's clerk, and if a human mistake is made that
in the interests of justice it should be rectified, then this appeal should be granted.
ARGUMENT
A. Judge Peuler's Holding That There Was Not Excusable Neglect Is
Incorrect
The issue for this Court to consider is a narrow one: What constitutes excusable
neglect? The question can actually be further refined in this case: Does an attorney's
reliance upon information provided to him/her by the District Court, which is later
discovered to be incorrect, constitute excusable neglect when the attorney relies on the
incorrect information to his/her detriment, and as a result misses the filing deadline for
filing a Notice of Appeal by one day? It is this Appellant's contention that the answer to
the later question must clearly be yes.
Excusable neglect, in the context of an attorney failing to file documents within
specified or statutorily defined time periods has been addressed by the U.S. Supreme
Court, the Federal Courts, and the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court in the
case of West v. Grand County, 942 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997), stated the following:
"Both the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit have articulated four factors relevant to a
determination of excusable neglect:
19
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"[i] the danger of prejudice to [the non-moving party], [ii] the length
of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, [iii] the reason
for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the
movant, and [iv] whether the movant acted in good faith." Id. at 340-41.
The District Court, Judge Peuler, utilized the foregoing factors and held that
"although it appears that the late filing does not prejudice plaintiff, nor was the length of
delay substantial, and further while there is no evidence that the movant acted in bad
faith, it appears to the Court that the reason for delay was not beyond the control of the
movant."34 Given the District Court's ruling, the issue is further refined to wether,
because the reason for the delay was not beyond the control of the movant, the delay
cannot be considered excusable neglect. In this regard, the U.S. Supreme Court decision
in Pioneer Investment Services v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd.. 570 U.S. 380, is helpful and
provides a detailed opinion fully analyzing the terminology "excusable neglect."
In the case of Pioneer Investment Services the Supreme Court specifically held
that the term "excusable neglect" is not strictly limited to "cases where the failure to act
[is] due to circumstances beyond the movants control." Id. at 386. Stated differently, and
in the context of this action, excusable neglect may be present in a case where the "reason
for delay was not beyond the control of the movant."35 The District Court simply
misapplied the standard when it held that because the reason for the delay was not beyond
the control of the movant that there could not be excusable neglect. As noted above, the
34

Minute Entry dated August 30,1999 (Index 232).

35

Minute Entry dated August 30, 1999 (Index 232).
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U.S. Supreme Court has specifically held that such a conclusion is wrong. Neglect may
take many forms. In Pioneer Investment Services the Supreme Court explained as
follows:
The ordinary meaning of "neglect" is "to give little attention or respect" to a
matter, or, closer to the point for our purposes, "to leave undone or
unattended to especially through carelessness" [citations omitted]. The
word therefore encompasses both simple, faultless omissions to act and,
more commonly, omissions caused by carelessness. Courts properly
assume, absent sufficient indication to the contrary, that Congress intends
the words in its enactments to cany "their ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning." [Citation omitted.] Hence, by empowering the courts to accept
late filings "where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect,"
Rule 9006(b)(1), Congress plainly contemplated that the courts would be
permitted, where appropriate, to accept late filings caused by inadvertence,
mistake, or carelessness, as well as by intervening circumstances beyond the
party's control."
Id. at 388. The Supreme Court also addressed the issue of what the term "excusable"
means and when the neglect of counsel will be considered "excusable." The Supreme
Court held as follows: "Because Congress has provided no other guideposts for
determining what sorts of neglect will be considered "excusable," we conclude that the
determination is, at bottom, an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances
surrounding the party's omission." Id. at 395. In the Pioneer Investment Services case,
the attorney for respondents had failed to timely file necessary proofs of claim with the
Bankruptcy Court. The notice of the date for filing had been forwarded to counsel for
respondents attorney, but in an unusual an inconspicuous notice regarding a creditors
meeting. In determining that the failure to timely file the proofs of claims was indeed
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excusable neglect, the Supreme Court stated the following:
"This is not to say, of course, that respondents' counsel was not
remiss in failing to apprehend the notice. To be sure, were there any
evidence of prejudice to petitioner or to judicial administration in this case,
or any indication at all of bad faith, we could not say that the Bankruptcy
Court abused its discretion in declining to find the neglect to be
"excusable." In the absence of such a showing, however, we conclude that
the unusual form of notice employed in this case requires afindingthat the
neglect of respondents' counsel was, under all circumstances, "excusable."
Id. at 398-99. In the present case, no one contests the fact that counsel for the Robertsons
contacted the clerk of the court within the 30 day period after the entry of the final order
granting the Motion for Summary Judgment. Although it was the 29th day, there was still
ample time for counsel for the Robertsons to file a Notice of Appeal the following day,
such that it would have been timely. However, as a direct result of being informed by the
Clerk of the Court that the final order was not entered until 2 days post its actual filing
date, thereby making counsel believe only 27 days had passed since entry of the final
order, counsel was lulled into a sense of security that he still had 3 days time to file the
notice of appeal. This is not even a case like Pioneer Investments where the attorney
failed to locate the date which had been provided. Rather, this is a case where counsel
actually contacted the Court to obtain information, and was provided with an inaccurate
date. As such, if the Supreme Court found that failing to locate an inconspicuous
deadline was excusable neglect as a matter of law, it follows that abiding by a deadline
provided by the Court, even though wrong, which counsel for the Robertsons did do in
filing prior to the 30 days as calculated from the date provided by the Clerk of the Court,
22
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must constitute excusable neglect as a matter of law.
Judge Peuler's ruling that the one day delay in filing was not excusable neglect is
factually and legally incorrect.
B.

The Unique Circumstances Doctrine Applies And Mandates A Reversal
Of Judge Peuler's Ruling

Alternatively, the facts presented in the case at hand allow it to fit squarely within
the "unique circumstances" doctrine. In the matter of Pinion v. Dow Chemical U.S.A.,
928 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1991), the Court succinctly set forth the "unique circumstances"
doctrine as follows:
Courts will permit an appellant to maintain an otherwise untimely appeal in unique
circumstances in which the appellant reasonably and in good faith relied upon judicial
action that indicated to the appellant that his assertion of his right to appeal would be
timely, so longs as the judicial action occurred prior to the expiration of the official time
period such that the appellant could have given timely notice had he not been lulled into
inactivity.
Id. at 1528 [16].36 In the present case, all of the elements of the unique circumstances
doctrine have been met. The final order regarding the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment was entered on February 8, 1999. Counsel for the Robertsons contacted the
Court on March 9, 1999, the 29th day after entry of the Order. As such, he contacted the

36

The 10 Circuit has likewise acknowledged the "unique circumstances" doctrine.
In Seniuro v Murray, 943 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1991) the Court held: "In carefully limited
circumstances, relief from an untimely notice of appeal may be available. If the district
court induced detrimental reliance by an appellant resulting in the filing of an untimely
notice of appeal, we may allow the appeal in Ihe "best interests of justice" given such
unique circumstances." Id. at 38.
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Court prior to whenthe official time period had run for filing of the Notice of Appeal.
Thereafter, counsel for the Robertsons reasonable, and in good faith relied upon the
information provided by the Court that the final order was not entered until February 10,
1999, thereby giving him until March 12 to file the Notice of Appeal. (The Notice was
actually served on March 11,1999.) As such, the unique circumstance doctrine should
be applied to permit the Robertsons to file their Notice of Appeal.
C.

Judge Peuler's Denial Of The Rule 59/60 Motion Was An Abuse Of
Discretion

Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that:
"a new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or
part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, however, that
on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may
open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony,
amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and
conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment:
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other
decision, or that it is against law.
(7) Error in Law.
The Robertsons clearly set forth in their Rule 59 Motion the facts and the law
which would justify the legal conclusion that the filing of the Notice of Appeal, one day
late, was excusable neglect. The Court held that because the "delay was not beyond the
control of the movant" that the delay in filing was not "excusable neglect.37 However, as
outlined above, this is an erroneous standard. Stated differently, there was no legal or

"Minute entry dated August 30,1999 (Index No. 232-33).
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factual basis for Judge Peuler's denial of the Rule 59/60 Motion.
Given that the only reason Judge Peuler provided for denying the Rule 59/60
Motion, was that the delay was not beyond the control of the movant, and such a standard
is incorrect, the denial of the Rule 59/60 Motion was an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
Judge Peuler ruled that because the reason for the delay infilingthe Notice of
Appeal was not beyond the control of movant, there was not "excusable neglect. In
making this ruling, Judge Peuler applied an incorrect standard as to what constitutes
"excusable neglect." Mr. Steffensen's reliance on information received directly from the
Court clearly constitutes excusable neglect. Further, his detrimental reliance on
information received from the District Court as to the date he needed to file the Notice of
Appeal puts this case squarely within the "unique circumstances" doctrine. Further,
Judge Peuler's refusal to modify her ruling pursuant to the Robertson's Rule 59/60
Motion constituted an abuse of discretion when the great weight of factual and legal
evidence demonstrated that counsel's conduct did indeed constitute excusable neglect.
Therefore, this Court should reverse such findings and remand this case to the District
Court with instructions to permit the Robertson's leave for an extension of time to renew
their Appeal.
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DATED this 3rd day of May, 2000

Mark A. Riekhof
Counsel for Appellant
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JUDICIAL CODE

3
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

30 district judges in the Third District;
12 district judges in the Fourth District;
four district judges in the Fifth District;
two district judges in the Sixth District;
three district judges in the Seventh District; and
two district judges in the Eighth District.
1998

8-1-2.3. Number of juvenile j u d g e s and jurisdictions.
The number of juvenile court judges shall be:
(1) two juvenile judges in the First Juvenile District;
(2) five juvenile judges in the Second Juvenile District;
(3) eight juvenile judges in the Third Juvenile District;
(4) fourjuvenile judges in the Fourth Juvenile District;
(5) two juvenile judges in the Fifth Juvenile District;
(6) one juvenile judge in the Sixth Juvenile District;
(7)^ two juvenile judges in the Seventh Juvenile District; and
(8) one juvenile judge in the Eighth Juvenile District
1999

78-1-2.4,78-1-3. Repealed.

199«

CHAPTER 2
SUPREME COURT
Section

78-2-1.

Number of justices — Terms — Chief justice and
associate chief justice — Selection and functions.
78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed.
78-2-2.
Supreme Court jurisdiction.
78-2-3.
Repealed.
78-2-4.
Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro tempore, and practice of law.
78-2-5.
Repealed.
78-2-6.
Appellate court administrator.
78-2-7.
Repealed.
78-2-7.5.
Service of sheriff to court.
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed.
78-2-1. Number of justices — Terms — Chief justice
and associate chief justice — Selection and
functions.
(1) The Supreme Court consists of five justices.
(2) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be appointed
initially to serve until the first general election held more than
three years after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a justice of the Supreme Court is ten
years and commences on the first Monday in January following the date of election. A justice whose term expires may
serve upon request of the Judicial Council until a successor is
appointed and qualified.
(3) The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a chief
justice from among the members of the court by a majority
vote of all justices. The term of the office of chief justice is four
years. The chief justice may serve successive terms. The chief
justice may resign from the office of chief justice without
resigning from the Supreme Court. The chief justice may be
removed from the office of chiefjustice by a majority vote of all
justices of the Supreme Court.
(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chiefjustice within 30
days of a vacancy in that office, the associate chiefjustice shall
act as chief justice until a chief justice is elected under this
section. If the associate chief justice is unable or unwilling to
act as chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as chief
justice until a chief justice is elected under this section.
(5) In addition to the chief justices duties as a member of
the Supreme Court, the chief justice has duties as provided by

78-2-2

(6) There is created the office of associate chief justice. The
term of office of the associate chief justice is two years. The
associate chief justice may serve in that office no more than
two successive terms. The associate chief justice shall be
elected by a majority vote of the members of the Supreme
Court and shall be allocated duties as the chief justice determines. If the chief justice is absent or otherwise unable to
serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief justice.
The chiefjustice may delegate responsibilities to the associate
chiefjustice as consistent with law.
1990
78-2-1.5,78-2-1.6. Repealed.

1971,1981

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer
questions of state law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all
extraordinary writs and authority to issue all writs and
process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments,
and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, oven
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of
Appeals prior to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative
proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands
Board of Trustees:
(iv) the Board of Oil. Gas. and Mining;
(v) the state engineer: or
tvi) the executive director of the Department of
Natural Resources reviewing actions of the Division
of Forestry, Fire and State Lands;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review
of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under
Subsection (e>;
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record
holding a statute of the United States or this state
unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the
United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction
of a first degree or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have
original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments,
or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has
original appellate jurisdiction, except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a
capital felony,
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a)
through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or
denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a
Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall
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JUDICIAL CODE

78-2-3

review those cases certified to it by the Court ofAppeals under
Subsection (3Xb).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements
of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative
proceedings.
is*6
78-2-3. Repealed.

19S«

78-2-4.

Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro tempore, and practice of law.
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and
evidence for use in the courts of the state and shall by rule
manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend
the rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the Supreme
Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses
of the Legislature.
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution,
the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and
judges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties.
Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States,
Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah.
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the practice of
law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and
discipline of persons admitted to the practice of law.
1986
78-2-5.

Repealed.

1988

78-2-6. A p p e l l a t e c o u r t a d m i n i s t r a t o r .
The appellate court administrator shall appoint clerks and
support staff as necessary for the operation of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals. The duties of the clerks and
support staff shall be established by the appellate court
administrator, and powers established by rule of the Supreme
Court.
1986

494

and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or
fraction thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in
panels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be by
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a
chair for each panel. The Court ofAppeals may not sit en banc.
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from among the members of the court by majority
vote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge is
two years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge of
the Court ofAppeals may serve in that office no more than two
successive terms. The Court ofAppeals may by rule provide for
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity
of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of
Appeals. In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of
Appeals, the presiding judge shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of
Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court
and the Judicial Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for
the Supreme Court.
1988

78-2a-3. Court of Appeals j u r i s d i c t i o n .
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue ail extraordinary writs and to issue all 'Ants and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and de78-2-7. R e p e a l e d .
1986
crees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
78-2-7.5. S e r v i c e of sheriff to court.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, includThe court may at any time require the attendance and
services of any sheriff in the state.
1988 ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, oven
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. R e p e a l e d .
1986, isss
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service CommisCHAPTER 2a
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire
COURT O F A P P E A L S
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive direcSection
tor of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil,
78-2a-l.
Creation — Seal.
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer,
78-2a-2.
Number of judges — Terms — Functions —
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
Filing fees.
- i\) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political
78-2a-3.
Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and
78-2a-4.
Review of actions by Supreme Court
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section
78-2a-5.
Location of Court of Appeals.
63-46a-12.1;
78-2a-6.
Appellate Mediation Office — Protected records
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
and information — Governmental immunity.
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first
degree or capital felony;
78-2a-l. C r e a t i o n — Seal.
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases,
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or
Court of Appeals is a court of record and shall have a seal.
capital felony,
1986
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions —
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting
Filing fees.
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term
degree or capital felony;
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordiuntil the first general election held more than three years
nary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first
term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and
degree or capital felony;
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the
(h) appeals from distort- ^«.,w- : »--date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon
the Howard
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
request of the Digitized
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Council,
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Art- VIII, § 1

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Section
6. [Number of judges of district court and other courts —
Divisions.)
7 [Qualifications of justices and judges ]
8 [Vacancies — Nominating commissions — Senate approval.]
9 [Judicial retention elections.]
10. [Restrictions on justices and judges ]
U. [Judges of courts not of record 1
12 [Judicial Council — Chiefjustice as administrative officer
— Legal counsel.]
13. [Judicial Conduct Commission.]
14. [Compensation of justices and judges ]
15. [Mandatory retirement.]
16. [Public prosecutors.]
17 to 28 [Repealed.]
Section 1. [Judicial powers — Courts.]
The judicial power of the state shall be vested m a supreme
court, ui a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the
(iistnct court, and in such other courts as the Legislature by
statute may establish The Supreme Court, the district court,
and such other courts designated by statute shall be courts of
record. Courts not of record shall also be established by
Statute

198* <2nd S3.)

Sec. 2. [Supreme court — Chief justice — Declaring
law unconstitutional — Justice unable to participate.]
The Supreme Court shall be the highest court and shall
consist of at least five justices The number of justices may be
changed by statute but no change shall have the effect of
removing a justice from office A chief justice shall be selected
from among the justices of the Supreme Court as provided bv
statute The chief justice mav resign as chief justice without
resigning from the Supreme Court The Supreme Court by
rule mav sit and render foal judgment either en banc or m
divisions The court shall not declare any law unconstitutional
under this constitution or the Constitution of the United
States, except on the concurrence of a majority of all justices of
the Supreme Court If a justice of the Supreme Court is
disqualified or otherwise unable to participate tn a cause
before the court, the chief justice, or in the event the chief
Justice is disqualified or unable to participate, the remaining
justices, shall call an active judge from an appellate court or
the district court to participate in the cause
1984 (2nd S3.)
Sec. 3. [Jurisdiction of Supreme Court.]
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue
all extraordinary writs and to answer questions of state law
certified by a court of the United States The Supreme Court
shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other matters to be
exercised as provided by statute, and power to issue all writs
and orders necessary for the exercise of the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction or the complete determination of any cause
1984 (2nd S3.)

Sec. 4. [Rule-making power of Supreme Court —
Judges pro tempore — Regulation of practice
of law.]
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and
evidence to be used m the courts of the state and shall by rule
manage the appellate process The Legislature may amend
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme
Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses
of the Legislature Except as otherwise provided by this
constitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired
Justices and judges and judges pro tempore to perform any
judicial duties Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the
United States, Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in
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Utah. The Supreme Court by rule shall govern the practice of
law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and
discipline of persons admitted to practice law
1984 (2nd S.S.)
Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts
— Right of appeal.]
The district court shall have original jurisdiction m all
matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute,
and power to issue all extraordinary writs The district court
shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute The
jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate,
shall be provided by statute Except for matters filed originally
with the Supreme Court, there shall be m all cases an appeal
of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with
appellate jurisdiction over the cause
1984 (2nd s^.)
Sec. 6. [Number of judges of district court and other
courts — Divisions.]
The number of judges of the district court and of other
courts of record established by the Legislature shall be provided by statute No change m the number ofjudges shall have
the effect of removing a judge from office during a judge's term
of office Geographic divisions for all courts of record except
the Supreme Court may be provided by statute No change m
divisions shall have the effect of removing a judge from office
during a judge s term of office
1984 f 2nd &S.)
Sec. 7. [Qualifications of justices and judges.]
Supreme Court justices shall be at least 30 years old. United
States citizens, Utah residents for five years preceding s»election, and admitted to practice law m Utah Judges of other
courts of record shall oe at least 25 years old, United States
citizens Utah residents for three years preceding selection,
and admitted to practice law in Utah If geographic divisions
are provided for any court, judges of that court shall reside in
the geograpnic division for which thev are selected
1984 <2ndS.S>

Sec. 8. [Vacancies — Nominating commissions — Senate approval.]
(1) When a vacancv occurs in a court of record the governor
shall fill the vacancv by appointment from a hbt of at least
three nominees certified to the governor by the Judicial
Nominating Commission having authority over the vacancy
The governor shall fill the vacancy within 30 days after
receiving the list of nominees If the governor fails to fill the
vacancy withm the time prescribed, the chief justice of the
Supreme Court shall withm 20 days make the appointment
from the list of nommees
(2) The Legislature by statute shall provide for the nominating commissions' composition and procedures No member
of the Legislature may serve as a member of, nor may the
Legislature appoint members to, any Judicial Nominating
Commission
(3) The Senate shall consider and render a decision on each
judicial appointment withm 60 days of the date of appointment. If necessary, the Senate shall convene itself in extraordinary session for the purpose of considenng judicial appointments The appointment shall be effective upon approval of a
majority of all members of the Senate If the Senate fails to
approve the appointment, the office shall be considered vacant
and a new nominating process shall commence
(4) Selection of judges shall be based solely upon consideration of fitness for office without regard to any partisan
political consideration
1992
Sec. 9. [Judicial retention elections.]
Each appointee to a court of record shall be subject to an
unopposed retention election at the first general election held
more than three years after appointment Following initial
voter approval, each Supreme Court justice every tenth year,
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Brian \V. Steffensen. P.C. (*?0<>:>

Steffensen

McDonald

Steffensen

2159 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (SOI )4S5-?707

BEFORE THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS
ARBITRATION DEPARTMENT

JAMES L. ROBERTSON,
and The Robertson Family Trust
Plaintiff;

STATEMENT OF CLAIM

vs.
VAN F. DUNN, an Individual;
and PAINEWEBBER (fka KIDDER,
PEABODY & COMPANY, INC.)
Defendants.

James L. Robertson, by and through his attorney, submits the following Statement of Claim:
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
1.

During 19S1, James L. Robertson sold some shares of stock that resulted in a profit thai was

unusually large for him. Mr. Robertson's broker in selling the stock was an acquaintance of his, Van
F. Dunn, who was an account executive at Kidder, Peabody & Co., Incorporated ("Kidder, Peabody'*)Mr. Dunn is a resident of Utah who resides at 4463 South Covecrcst Dr., Holladay, UT 84124.
2.

Because of his unusually large gainfromthe sale of stock, in the Spring of 1981 Mr. Robertson

met with Mr. Dunn to discuss whether a tax shelter investment would be suitable for him. During this
meeting Mr. Robertson told Mr. Dunn that because of the recent sale of stock, and that because he
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would be selline more stock in the near future, his income during 19S1 would be unusually high. Mr.
Robcnson asked Mr. Dunn if he knew of a cood tax shelter investment that would net only shelter his
income in 1981, but that would turn a profit in a fairly short time period, or around five years. Mr.
Robertson also told Mr. Dunn that he needed the safest possible investment. Moreover. Mr. Robertson
told Mr. Dunn that he had not been in a 50% tax bracket before 19S1. and that he didn't expect to be
in the 50% tax bracket in the future.
3.

In response to Mr. Robertson's inquiry about the safest possible investment, Mr. Dunn

recommended an investment in Lauren Plaza Associates. Ltd ("Lauren Plaza"), an Illinois Limited
partnership that was financing a shopping center in Louisiana. Mr. Dunn indicated that because Lauren
Plaza contemplated selling its investment in the shopping center within approximately five years, that
an investment in the partnership would: 1) shelter income in the short term, and 2) result in a profit
within a fairly short time.
4.

Because he did not feel comfortable simply relying on his own judgment before making this

investment, Mr. Robertson had his accountant. E. Dickson Adams, meet wiih Mr. Dunn to discuss the
investment. Mr. Dunn convinced Mr. Adams that the Lauren Plaza was not only suitable for Mr.
Robertson, but also that Mr. Robertson should purchase two units in the Lauren Plaza, rather than just
one; for a total price of S 158,000.00.
5.

Therefore, because of Mr. Dunn's recommendation, and in reliance upon Mr. Dunn's

recommendation, Mr. Robertson purchased two shares in the Lauren Plaza, for a total price of
S158,000.00. See "Subscription Agreement", a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit * T \
6.

Subsequent to making his investment in the Lauren Plaza, Mr. Robertson transfered his

ownership of the Lauren Plaza shares to the Robertson Family Trust Mr. Robertson has authority to
2
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bring this claim on behalf of the trust. See Trust Agreement, attached hereto 3S Exhibit '2'\
7.

In 19S4. Mr. Robertson contacted the general partner in the Lauren Plaza. Balcor Management

Services. Inc.. and asked about the appreciated value of the partnership based on the 9S% occupancy
level supposedly being maintained in the shopping center. Balcor did not opine as to the value of the
partnership or its shares because there was no plan to sell the shopping center; therefore no appraisal
was available. This concerned Mr. Robertson because he had understood, based on Mr. Dunn's
representations, that the shopping center would be sold wiihin five years of 19S1, resulting in a
substantial profit to investors in Lauren Plaza.
S.

In 19S6, Mr. Robertson was informed by Balcor Management Services, Inc., that although the

occupancy level in the shopping center was 97%, problems had developed, and there were no plans
to sell the property at that time.
9.

In every annual report after 1986. Blacor reported problems but continued to express optimism.

In fact in 19S9. Balcor reported rents were being collected on 95% of the property. In the November
1990 report Balcor states, "...net cash flew is ahead of our projection for the year."
iO.

In the 1991 annual report Balcor states, "Our original intention was to hold the property for

iive to :en years from acquisition in 1981. or until such time as a sale or refinancing would meet the
partnerships objectives. We are now in the twelfth year of the holding period, and we anticipate
holding the property an additional two to three years, assuming a loan modification is negotiated.**
11.

In a letter to the shareholders dated October 1991, Balcor said, "Operating cash flow from

Lauren Plaza improved during thefirstnine months of the year and exceeded our budget projections.
We now expect 1991 cash flow to be a significant improvement over 1990/*
12.

However, in a letter to shareholders dated October 1992, Balcor wrote, "A foreclosure sale has
3
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been scheduled for October 21. 1W2. at which point we expect :hc partnership to relinquish title to
this property." See Exhibit "3" attached hereto.
13.

Mr. Robertson relied on Mr Dunn's representations that the Lauren PIaz3 was a suitable

in\estment for him. and Mr. Robertson would not ha\e inxested in Lauren Plaza but for Mr. Dunn's
recommendations. In fact, die Lauren Plaza was not a suitable in\estment for Mr. Robertson because,
among other tilings 1) he was not in the 50% tax bracket before or after the calendar year 19S1. and
2) the partnership shares were not easily transferable, there being no market for the shares.
14.

Because of the foreclosure on the Lauren Plaza propeny. Mr. Robertson lost S154.050.00

(SI58,000.00 invested less S3;950 cash distributions).
15.

Subsequent to Mr. Robertson's acquisition of shares in Lauren Plaza, Kidder, Peabody <£: Co.,

Incorporated, was acquired by respondent PaineWeber, which is the succesor in interest to Kidder,
Peabod}. Psine^Veber is located at I~0 S. Main St.. Salt Lake Cir\. UT i telephone I-S00-521-SS40).

REQUEST FOR RELIEF
1.

MrTRobertson is entidecf toTjudgmraunliis favoTof S154",050."5(Tpius anblriiyFfeesTcostsr

and puniti\ e damages in an amount determined by the Arbitration Panel to be fair and just under the
circumstances.
DATED this /*-' day of March. 199S.
BRIAN W. S7EFFENSEN, ?.C.

t^s^/9^
By: Brian W.jSteffcn/e

4
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PAINEWEBBER INC Et al,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
MOTION FOR STAY

vs.

Case No: 980910104 MI

ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

DENNIS M FUCHS
November 17, 1998

wendypg

PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): ROBERT PAYNE
Defendant's Attorney(s): BRIAN STEFFENSEN
Video
Tape Number:
11/17/98
Tape Count: 10:00

HEARING
The above entitled case comes before the court for Oral Arguments
on Plaintiff's Motion for Stay. Based upon respective counsel's
argument, court grants a Temporary Stay. Robert Payne is to prepare
the Order.
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TS5* 0 , , S T !IICT COURT
Robert W. Payne (5334)
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P.
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)237-1900
Facsimile: (801)237-1950

'UKfc COUNTY
"DeputTcfertT

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PAINEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware
corporation, KIDDER PEABODY & CO.,
INC., a Delaware corporation, and VAN
FRANCIS DUNN, JR., an individual,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

ORDER TEMPORARILY STAYING
ARBITRATION PROCEEDING
Case No. 980910104
Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs

The ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, by and
through JAMES L. ROBERTSON, Trustee,
Defendant.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Temporarily Staying Arbitration Proceeding came on
regularly before the Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs, on November 17, 1998, at 9:00 a.m. Robert
W. Payne, of the law firm of Snell & Wilmer, appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs. Brian W.
Steffensen, of the law firm of Steffensen, McDonald & Steffensen, appeared on behalf of the
defendant. The Court having reviewed the memoranda submitted by the parties, having heard
oral argument in support of and in opposition to the motion, the Court having announced from
the Bench its decision regarding the motion, and good cause appearing therefor,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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THE COURT FINDS as follows:
1.

Defendant failed to carry its burden to demonstrate the existence of an arbitration

agreement between these parties.
2.

Jurisdictions are divided over the issue of who, as between courts and arbitrators,

are the appropriate persons to determine whether an action is time-barred under § 10304 of the
NASD Code.
3.

In Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 78 F.3d 474 (10th Cir.

1996), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that courts should determine the applicability of §
10304 of the NASD Code.
4.

In light of the delay of over sixteen years between defendant's investment and the

filing of its arbitration claims, defendant is unlikely to suffer any harm from a temporary stay of
the arbitration proceeding pending this Court's determination of plaintiff s Motion for Summary
Judgment.
Therefore, THE COURT ORDERS as follows:
1.

Based upon the apparent absence of an arbitration agreement between these

parties, based upon the reasoning in Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fermer & Smith Inc., 78
F.3d 474 (10th Cir. 1996), and based upon the arguments set forth in plaintiffs' memoranda,
plaintiffs' Motion for Order Temporarily Staying Arbitration Proceeding is hereby granted.
2.

NASD Arbitration Case Number 98-00981 is hereby stayed pending the Court's

determination of plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment, which motion wasfiledwith the
Court on November 12,1998.

2
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MADE AND ENTERED this _£_ day of (£}&**'

, 1998

BYTHECO

DENNIS MAEJCHS
iV
Third JudiciarDistriet
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Brian W. Steffensen
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CERTIFICATE OF SKR VTCF.

I hereby certify that on the 17th day of November, 1998,1 caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER TEMPORARILY STAYING ARBITRATION PROCEEDING to
be served by regular mail, via United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, on the following:
Brian W. Steffensen
STEFFENSEN, McDONALD & STEFFENSEN
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

\

PAYNER\SLC\072413.0t
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IIFIIEB DISTRICT;
f ^^%Third JiidiclafDistrict

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PAINEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware
corporation, KIDDER, PEABODY &
CO• INC., a Delaware corporation
and VAN FRANCIS DUNN, JR., an
individual,

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO.

980910104

Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, toy
and through JAMES L. ROBERTSON,
Trustee,
Defendant.

Defendant has had an opportunity to conduct discovery and an
open invitation from plaintiff to request any documents they needed
and defendant has failed to request documents. The Court therefore
denies defendant's request to stay the determination of Summary
Judgment pending further discovery.
There still being no written agreement for arbitration, the
Court finds the Motion for Summary Judgment is ripe for decision
and finds that the Court has jurisdiction over the issue of
arbitration as per the argument of plaintiff and ruling of the
Court granting the temporary stay of arbitration.
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PAINEWEBBER V . ROBERTSON

PAGE TWO

MINUTE ENTRY

The Court finds that if the NASD is interpreted as a statute
of repose, the six year limitation started running 1981. However,
even if the Court should consider the NASD rule as a statute of
limitations and as per the argument of defense that the discovery
rule should apply, the Court would find that the Robertson Trust
was put on notice long before 1992 that there were significant
problems with.the investment.

Defendant should have been on notice

from approximately 1984 forward.

The Court finds that with any

kind of diligent investigation on the part of defendant he would
have discovered the problems.
For the foregoing reasons and the additional argument as
contained in plaintiff's Memorandum, the Court finds that the
action

is time barred

and hereby

Plaintiff is to prepare the Order.

grants plaintiff's Motion.
-rT"^rr>^
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PAINEWEBBER V. ROBERTSON

PAGE THREE

MINUTE ENTRY

MMLING CERTIFICATE

1 hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following, this 1 (
day of January, 1999:

Robert W. Payne
Attorney for Plaintiffs
111 E. Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Brian W. Steffensen
Attorney for Defendant
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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PILES OJSTSICT COURT
Third Judicial District

Robert W. Payne (5334)
SNELL & WTLMER L.L.P.
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)237-1900
Facsimile: (801)237-1950

By-

Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PAINEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware
corporation, KIDDER PEABODY & CO.,
INC., a Delaware corporation, and VAN
FRANCIS DUNN, JR., an individual,
Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, ORDER
AND JUDGMENT GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Case No. 980910104

vs.

Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs
The ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, by and
through JAMES L. ROBERTSON, Trustee,
Defendant.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Motion for Summary Judgment and defendant's request for a Rule
56(f) continuance were fully briefed by the parties and submitted to the Court for decision.
The Court, having reviewed all of the motions, memoranda, affidavits and other evidence
submitted by the parties, and good cause appearing therefore, finds, concludes and orders as
follows:
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FINDINGS OF FACT
Plaintiffs presented the following material facts in support of their motion for summary
judgment. Defendants produced no evidence to dispute these facts:
1.

In 1981, plaintiffs assisted James L. Robertson with the purchase of an interest in

Lauren Plaza Associates, Ltd ("Lauren Plaza") which owned and operated a shopping center.
2.

Plaintiffs and Mr. Robertson did not enter into a written agreement between them

relating to the Lauren Plaza investment or relating to any other matter.
3.

There was no further interaction between plaintiffs and defendant after 1981.

4.

Defendant claims that James L. Robertson purchased the Lauren Plaza Investment

based upon plaintiffs' erroneous investment advice and that the advice was erroneous 1) because
James L. Robertson was not in a 50% tax bracket in or after 1981; 2) because the shares were not
easily transferrable, there being no market for the shares; 3) because the shopping center was not
sold within five years resulting in a quick profit; and 4) because Lauren Plaza was not the safest
possible investment.
5.

In 1984, Balcor, the general partner of Lauren Plaza, told Mr. Robertson that

there were no plans to sell the shopping center. This information concerned Mr. Robertson
because he had understood from the investment advise that the shopping center would be sold
within five years of 1981, resulting in a substantial profit to investors in Lauren Plaza.
6.

In 1986, Balcor told Mr. Robertson that there were no plans to sell the shopping

center and that problems had developed.
7.

In every Lauren Plaza annual report after 1986, Balcor reported problems.

2
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8.

In 1991, Balcor informed Mr. Robertson that the partnership planned to hold the

shopping center for another two to three years if the partnership could negotiate a loan
modification.
9.

Defendant ignored plaintiffs' invitation to request any documentation that it

believed would be helpful to oppose plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Defendant has
not attempted to do any formal or informal discovery in this case.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has jurisdiction to consider the eligibility of defendant's claims for

arbitration under Rule 10304 of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure. Cogswell v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 78 F.3d 474,476 (10th Cir. 1996).
2.

Defendant is not entitled to a Rule 56(f) continuance because it has neglected to

do any formal or informal discovery to date, has failed to explain why it cannot present sufficient
evidence to support its opposition, Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 840 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987), and has failed to "explain how the requested continuance will aid [its] opposition to
summary judgment." Sandy City v. Salt Lake County. 794 P.2d 482, 488 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
3.

Rule 10304 of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure provides a substantive

limit on claims that may be submitted to arbitration in the nature of a statute of repose. Cogswell
v, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 78 F.3d 474,479 (10th Cir. 1996). CL Raithaus
v. Saah-Scandia of America, Inc., 784 P.2d 1158, 1160 (Utah 1989). Thus, defendant's claims
became ineligible for arbitration in 1987, six years from the date that James Robertson purchased
his investment in Lauren Plaza.
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4.

Even if Rule 10304 is construed to be a statute of limitations, defendant's claims

were barred no later than 1990. James Robertson discovered, or would have discovered through
any kind of diligent investigation, that his investment had serious problems beginning in 1984.
The limitations period began to run upon first learning of his legal injury in 1984, not upon
learning of the full extent of his damages in 1992. Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93, 99-100 (Utah
1982).
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
The Court, having carefully considered the arguments for and against the
summary judgment and the request for a Rule 56(f) continuance, and the Court having
announced its decisions regarding the motion and request in a minute entry dated January 11,
1999, and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

2.

Defendants request for a Rule 56(f) continuance is denied.

3.

NASD arbitration proceeding. Case No. 98-00981, is permanently stayed.

4.

Defendant is permanently enjoined from seeking to arbitrate any claims against

plaintiffs that are based upon events and occurrences that took place more than six years prior to
the date of this order.

4
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MADE AND

ENTERED this _ / _ day of February, 1999.
BY THE

DENNIS
Third Judicia
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JUNO 3 1999
By.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

Deputy Clerk

ooOoo
Painewebber, Inc., a Delaware
corporation, Kidder Peabody &
Co., a Delaware corporation,
and Van Francis Dunn, Jr., an
individual,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,

No. 990261

v.
The Robertson Family Trust, by
and through James L. Robertson,
trustee,
Defendant and Appellant,

ORDER
Plaintiffs' motion for summary dismissal is granted.
Defendant filed its appeal one day late, and this court lacks
jurisdiction over the case. Defendant's remedy lies with the
district court if it seeks an extension of time in which to renew
its appeal.
BY THE COURT:

Date:-

// (ttr
:hard C. Howe
Chief Justice
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Brian W. Steffensen, P.C. (3092)
Steffensen • McDonald • Steffensen
2159 S. 700 E., Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Tel: (801) 485-3707
Fax: (801) 485-7140
Attorney for Defendant the Robertson Family Trust

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PATNEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware
Corporation, KIDDER PEABODY & CO.,
INC., a Delaware Corporation, and VAN
FRANCIS DUNN, JR., an individual,
Plaintiffs,

AFFIDAVIT OF BRIAN W
STEFFENSEN IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
AN EXTENSION OF TIME IN WHICH
TO FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.

The ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, by
and through JAMES L. ROBERTSON,
Trustee,
Civil No. 980910104
Defendant.
Judge Sandra Peuler (originally assigned to
Judge Fuchs and reassigned to Judge Peuler)

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Brian Steffensen, being first duly sworn and under oath, testifies as follows:
1.

I am over the age of 21 years, I am of sound mind, and I give the testimony in this affidavit
of my own free will. I am a member in good standing of the Utah State Bar Association, and
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I am the attorney for defendant/appellant The Robertson Family Trust (the "Robertson
Family")in the above-captioned case. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained in
this affidavit.
On or about March 9,1999,1 called JUDGE FUCHS' clerk at the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County and inquired if the District Court had entered its Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order And Judgment Granting Summary Judgment in the aboveentitled action. I made this inquiry because I had not received an Order issued by the District
Court even though the plaintiffs had filed their proposed form of Order with the Court. At
that time, the clerk informed me that the Court had issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, Order and Judgment Granting Summary Judgment on February 10, 1999 (the "Final
Order"). Because the District Court did not send to me a copy of the Final Order, I had not
previously been aware that the Court had issued the Final Order.
Therefore, based on the representation of the District Court's Clerk, I calculated that the
Robertson Family had thirty daysfromFebruary 10, 1999, in which to file a Notice of
Appeal to appeal the District Court's rulings and orders in this action. Thus, it was my
understanding that the Robertson Family had until March 12,1999 in which to file its Notice
of Appeal. Therefore, I executed a Notice of Appeal and gave it to my secretary for filing on
Wednesday, March 10, 1999, instructing her to file it with the District Court that day and
pay the appropriate filing fee. However, my secretary apparently did not file the Notice of
Appeal with the District Court until the next day, March 11,1999, because she did not
believe that the deadline for filing would run until Friday, March 12,1999.
I assumed that when my messenger filed the Notice of Appeal with the District Court, that
2
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the appropriate filing fee was also paid. This is because I instructed my secretary to pay the
fee, and because the office of the Clerk of the District Court accepted the Notice of Appeal
and filed the same. In my experience, whenever we have presented afilingrequiring a fee
without a check, thefilinghas not been accepted. I usually have received a call right then
and asked to send down a check. However, on March 18,1999, Wendy Purnell, the front
office clerk of the Judge Fuchs, telephoned me and told me that she could not docket the
Robertson Family's Notice of Appeal because the requisite filing fee had not been filed.
Therefore, I immediately filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on March 18,1999, and filed it
with the District Court along with the requisite filing fee.
DATED this 7?

day of June, 1999.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ^Sj,

day of*fe^l999.

NOTARY PUBLIC

AMA.

Residing at:

My Commission Expires:

NOTARY PUBLIC

MELISA HANSEN
2159So.700E..Ste.100
Salt Lake CUy, Utah
84106by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized
My Commission Expires
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

Painewebber, Inc., a Delaware
corporation, Kidder Peabody &
Co., a Delaware corporation,
and Van Francis Dunn, Jr., an
individual,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,

No. 990261

v.
The Robertson Family Trust, by
and through James L. Robertson,
trustee,
Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER
Plaintiffs' motion for summary dismissal is granted.
Defendant filed its appeal one day late, and this court lacks
jurisdiction over the case. Defendant's remedy lies with the
district court if it seeks an extension of time in which to renew
its appeal.
BY THE COURT:

^r^

t,

(Iff

^ C

Richard C. Howe
Chief Justice
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PAINEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware
:
corporation, KIDDER, FEABODY £
CO. INC., a Delaware corporation;
and VAN FRANCIS DUNN, JR., an
individual,
:
Plaintiffs,
vs.

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO.

980910104

:
:

THE ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, by :
and through JAMES L. ROBERTSON,
Trustee,
:
Defendant.

:

Before the Court is a Notice to Submit for Decision on
defendants Motion for Extension of Time in Which to File Notice of
Appeal.

The Court having reviewed the pleadings filed in this

matter, now enters the following ruling.
The defendant's Motion for Extension of Time is denied.
Defendant's failure to timely file its appeal is not excusable
neglect.

Although it appears that the late filing does not

prejudice plaintiff, nor was the length of delay substantial, and
further while there is no evidence that the movant acted in bad
faith, it appears to the Court that the reason for delay was not
beyond the control of the movant.

As pointed out by plaintiff,

defendant knew that the Court had granted Summary Judgment on or
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PAINEWEBBER V. ROBERTSON

about January 11, 1999.
January

PAGE TWO

MINUTE ENTRY

Further, the defendant knew on or about

23 that plaintiff had

submitted

its proposed Order.

Defendant's failure to check with the clerk for a period in excess
of 30 days to see whether an Order had been entered was neglect,
but is not excusable.

Based upon that, the defendants Motion is

denied.
Counsel

for

plaintiff

is

directed

to

prepare

an

Order

consistent with this ruling.
Dated this

^

day of August, 1999.

Si^NDRA N. PEUliBR c
DISTRICT COURTVffUDGI
%
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v *V

FILES DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

Robert W. Payne (5334)
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P.
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)237-1900
Facsimile: (801)237-1950

SEP - 9 1399

» TtpW
Q Deputy Cierk

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PAINEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware
corporation, KIDDER PEABODY & CO.,
INC., a Delaware corporation, and VAN
FRANCIS DUNN, JR., an individual,

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
EXTENSION OF TIME IN WHICH
TO FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs,
Case No. 980910104
vs.

Honorable Sandra N. Peuler
The ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, by and
through JAMES L. ROBERTSON, Trustee,
Defendant.

Defendant's Motion for Extension of Time in Which to File Notice of Appeal came
regularly before the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, on August 30,1999. The Court, having
reviewed the memoranda and pleadings submitted by the parties and having announced its
decision regarding the motion in a minute entry, and good cause appearing therefor,
THE COURT FINDS AND CONCLUDES as follows:
A.
1999.

Defendant knew that the Court had grant Summary Judgment on or about July 11,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

B.

Defendant knew that plaintiff had submitted a proposed Order on summary

judgment on or about January 23, 1999.
C.

Despite this knowledge, defendant failed to check with the clerk for a period in

excess of thirty (30) days to see whether the order had been executed by the Court.
D.

Although the late filing does not appear to have prejudice the plaintiff, the length

of delay was not substantial, and there is no evidence that defendant acted in bad faith,
defendant's delay in checking with the Court and timely filing its appeal does not appear to have
been beyond the control of the defendant.
E.

Defendant's delay for more than thirty (30) days to see whether the Court had

entered the proposed order was neglect.
F.

Defendant's neglect in failing to timely file its appeal is not excusable.

Therefore, THE COURT ORDERS as follows:
Defendant's Motion for Extension of Time in Which to File Notice of Appeal is hereby
denied.
MADE AND ENTERED this °j day of September, 1999.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Brian W. Steffensen
2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVTCE
I hereby certify that on the 1st day of September, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME IN WHICH
TO FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served by regular mail, via United States Postal
Service, postage prepaid, on the following:
Brian W. Steffensen
STEFFENSEN, McDONALD & STEFFENSEN
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

PAYNER\SLC\072413.0l
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FILED

Brian W. Steffensen, P.C. (3092)
Steff ensen • McDonald • Steffensen
2159 S. 700 E., Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Tel: (801)485-3707
Fax: (801)485-7140
Attorney for Defendant the Robertson Family Trust

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PAINEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware
Corporation, KIDDER PEABODY & CO.,
INC., a Delaware Corporation, and VAN
FRANCIS DUNN, JR., an individual,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

The ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, by
and through JAMES L. ROBERTSON,
Trustee,
Defendant.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION RE THEIR
MOTION FOR
AN EXTENSION OF TIME IN WHICH
TO FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL
AND OBJECTION TO PROPOSED
ORDER
And Request for Hearing

Civil No. 980910104
Judge Sandra Peuler (originally assigned to
Judge Fuchs and reassigned to Judge Peuler)

In issuing its ruling on Defendants' Motion for an Extension of Time in Which to File
Notice of Appeal, the Court based its denial of said motion on the erroneous assumption of fact
that Defendants had not inquired as to the execution of the order within the thirty (30) day
appeal time period - and ruled that this was not "excusable neglect."
The true facts are, as outlined in the attached affidavit which was filed with the Utah
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Supreme Court, as follows:
1.

Defendants counsel inquired as to the execution of the order on or about March 9, 1999 —
the 29th day.

2.

A Clerk of Court told Defendants' counsel that the order had been executed on February
10, 1999. This was in error, but Defendants' counsel relied upon it.

3.

The Notice of Appeal was drafted and staff instructed to file it on March 10, 1999.
However, thinking that there was no rush, the Notice of Appeal was not actually filed
with the Court until the next day, March 11, 1999.

Since the true facts are that Defendants did inquire as to the date of execution within the thirty
day time period, but were given inaccurate information which caused them to miss the deadline
by a single day, Defendants respectfully request that the Court reconsider its denial of the Motion
for Extension. The actions of Defendants in these regards constituted excusable neglect and
justice and equity demand that they be allowed to proceed with their appeal.
These facts, plus the case law cited in Defendants moving papers, support the granting of
the motion in question.
Defendants object to the proposed Order being signed until their Motion for
Reconsideration is resolved.
Defendants request a hearing on their Motion for Reconsideration.
DATED this /j^dav of September, 1999.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing paper this / ^ _ day of_
1999, via the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to:

Bryon J. Benevento
Robert W. Payne
SNELL & WILMER, L.L.P.
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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Brian W. Steffensen, P.C. (3092)
Steffensen • M c D o n a l d • Steffensen
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Tel: (801)485-3707
Fax: (801)485-7140
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant The Robertson Family Trust

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

PATNEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware
Corporation, KIDDER PEABODY & CO.,
INC., a Delaware Corporation, and VAN
FRANCIS DUNN, JR., an individual,

AFFIDAVIT OF
BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN
IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION

Plaintiffs/Appellees,
Civil Case No. 980910104
Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs

vs.

The ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, by
and through JAMES L. ROBERTSON,
Trustee,

Case No. 990261-SC

Defendant/Appellant.

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Brian Steffensen, being first duly sworn and under oath, testifies as follows:
1.

I am over the age of 21 years, I am of sound mind, and I give the testimony in this affidavit
of my own free will. I am a member in good standing of the Utah State Bar Association,
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and I am the attorney for defendant/appellant The Robertson Family Trust (the "Robertson
Family")in the above-captioned case. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained in
this affidavit.
On or about March 9, 1999,1 called JUDGE FUCHS' clerk at the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County and inquired if the District Court had entered its Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order And Judgment Granting Summary Judgment in the aboveentitled action. I made this inquiry because I had not received an Order issued by the
District Court even though the plaintiffs/appellees had filed their proposed form of Order
with the Court. At that time, the clerk informed me that the Court had issued its Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment Granting Summary Judgment on February
10, 1999 (the "Final Order"). Because the District Court did not send to me a copy of the
Final Order, I had not previously been aware that the Court had issued the Final Order.
Therefore, based on the representation of the District Court's Clerk, I calculated that the
Robertson Family had thirty days from February 10, 1999, in which to file a Notice of
Appeal to appeal the District Court's rulings and orders in this action. Thus, it was my
understanding that the Robertson Family had until March 12, 1999 in which to file its
Notice of Appeal. Therefore, I executed a Notice of Appeal and gave it to my secretary for
filing on Wednesday, March 10, 1999, instructing her to file it with the District Court that
day and pay the appropriate filing fee. However, my secretary apparently did not file the
Notice of Appeal with the District Court until the next day, March 11, 1999, because she
did not believe that the deadline for filing would run until Friday, March 12, 1999.
I assumed that when my messenger filed the Notice of Appeal with the District Court, that
2
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the appropriate filing fee was also paid. This is because I instructed my staff to pay the fee,
and because the office of the Clerk of the District Court accepted the Notice of Appeal and
filed the same. In my experience, whenever we have presented a filing requiring a fee
without a check, thefilinghas not been accepted. I usually have received a call right then
and asked to send down a check. However, on March 18,1999, Wendy Purnell, the front
office clerk of the Judge Fuchs, telephoned me and told me that she could not docket the
Robertson Family's Notice of Appeal because the requisite filing fee had not been filed.
Therefore, I immediately filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on March 18,1999, and filed
it with the District Court along with the requisite filing fee.
DATED this

day of September, 1999.

y^*
Brian W. Steffensen
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
The Robertson Family Trust
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

day of May, 1999.

-§&
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:

My Commission Expires:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing paper this

day of September, 1999,

via the United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, to:

Bryon J. Benevento
Robert W. Payne
SNELL & WILMER, L.L.P.
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

5/<^
Brian W. Steffensen
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FILES 3I87S53GT COURT
Third Judicial District

DEC - 81999

Robert W. Payne (5334)
SNELL&WILMERLLP

111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)237-1900
Facsimile: (801)237-1950
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PATNEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware
corporation, KIDDER, PEABODY & CO.
INC., a Delaware corporation, and VAN
FRANCIS DUNN, JR., an individual,

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
RECONSIDER
Case No. 980910104

Plaintiffs,

Honorable Sandra N. Peuler
vs.
The ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, by and
through JAMES L. ROBERTSON, Trustee,
Defendant.

Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration re their Motion for an Extension of Time in
Which to File Notice of Appeal came regularly before the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, on
November

, 1999. The Court, having reviewed the memoranda and pleadings submitted by

the parties, and good cause appearing therefor,
THE COURT FINDS AND CONCLUDES as follows:
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A.

Defendant did not submit a timely objection to defendants' proposed Order

Denying Motion for Extension of Time in Which to File Notice of Appeal as permitted by Rule
4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
B.

On September 9, 1999, the Court entered its Order Denying Motion for Extension

of Time in Which to File Notice of Appeal.
C.

On September 13, 1999, plaintiff submitted a Motion for Reconsideration re their

Motion for an Extension of Time in Which to File Notice of Appeal.
D.

Motions to reconsider are not provided for under the Utah Rules oi ^ivn

Procedure and have never been recognized as a proper motion in this state.
E.

The arguments set forth in plaintiffs motion to reconsider are not persuasive.

THEREFORE, the Court declines plaintiffs invitation to reconsider its September 9,
1999, Order Denying Motion for Extension of Time in Which to File Notice of Appeal.
MADE AND ENTERED this _0_ day of Noyfember, 1999.
BY THE COURT:

2 Clark Law School, BYU.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of November, 1999,1 caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing proposed ORDER DENYING MOTION TO RECONSIDER to
be served, via United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, on the following:

Brian W. Steffensen

STEFFENSEN, McDONALD & STEFFENSEN
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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